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The growth experience of virtually all but the very rich countries is best explained as
a combination of high and low growth episodes. Therefore, there is a need to under-
stand the sources of growth during high and low growth regimes and in particular the
in°uences as growth regimes change. This paper approaches the issue by combining
the derivation of structural breaks in economic growth with nonparametric growth
accounting that enables the decomposition of productivity changes into technologi-
cal and e±ciency changes. The results show that even in the medium run growth
rate changes are mainly the result of productivity changes whereas factor accumula-
tion plays only a minor role. Except for high income countries productivity changes
usually represent e±ciency changes. A comparison of growth take-o®s and growth
collapses reveals that factor accumulation is even less important in periods of acceler-
ating growth.
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11 Introduction
The focus of the empirical growth literature has shifted from explaining di®erences in
average growth rates across countries to analyzing the responsible factors for growth
regime changes, i. e. variations of the growth rates within countries. This shift of focus
is necessary because most countries do not experience high or low periods of growth
consistently but rather a combination of high and low growth episodes, thus making
the average growth rate a vulnerable concept (Pritchett(2000, 2001)). This paper aims
at identifying the causes of growth transitions by combining a statistical method to
identify growth regime changes with a nonparametric approach to growth accounting.
The paper is inspired by a recent contribution by Jones and Olken (2005). The au-
thors analyze the proximate causes of growth regime switches by means of traditional
growth accounting. They ¯nd that growth accelerations and decelerations are asym-
metric events in that changes in factor accumulation are signi¯cantly more important
for growth decelerations. For both types of growth transitions, however, factor accu-
mulation plays a surprisingly little role: less than ten percent of growth accelerations
and about thirty percent of growth decelerations are explained by factor accumulation,
leaving the major explanatory power to productivity changes. While the importance
of total factor productivity changes for long run growth is by now widely accepted
(Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2001), Prescott (1998), Caselli (2004))
and consistent with the neoclassical growth models (Solow (1956), Barro (2003)), the
importance of these changes in the short run is somewhat surprising. Transitional dy-
namics in the neoclassical growth models are driven by changes in the capital stock.
Poverty trap models often focus on a nonconvexity in factor accumulation to explain
why some nations fail to escape poverty (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (1997)). Finally, there is some agreement that industrialization
in the initial phase is about capital accumulation (Galor and Moav (2004), Porter
(1990), Ch. 10). Therefore, one would expect to see an important role for capital
accumulation in initializing episodes of fast economic growth at least in low income
countries.
This paper applies a nonparametric methodology to reassess the ¯ndings by Jones
and Olken (2005). Their use of growth accounting implicitly assumes that the economies
are organized competitively, that the production technology follows the suggested
Cobb-Douglas form and that technological progress is Hicks neutral. Nonparametric
growth accounting does not need these assumptions. All that is required is an assump-
tion about the returns to scale. A further advantage lies in the procedure's ability to
2decompose changes in total factor productivity into changes in the e±ciency of produc-
tion and technological changes. Growth accounting simply assumes that production is
e±cient at any point in time and attributes all changes in total factor productivity to
technological change. Apart from this change in methodology four further re¯nements
compared to Jones and Olken (2005) are implemented. First, the growth regimes are
determined using the combined double maximum supFT(` + 1j`) testing procedure,
which increases the power of the statistical tests. Second, the minimum duration of
growth episodes is set to ten years, thus ensuring that growth regime changes are not
confounded with business cycles.1 Third, production is speci¯ed in terms of capital
per worker and not capital per inhabitant. Furthermore, by using the Penn World
Tables Mark 6.2 the length of the data series is extended.
Despite the di®erences in methodology and its tendency to attribute a larger frac-
tion of growth to factor accumulation (Kumar and Russel (2002), Henderson and Rus-
sell (2005)) my results closely match those of Jones and Olken (2005). Growth regime
changes are common across countries and time periods and are predominantly driven
by changes in total factor productivity. Changes in total factor productivity chie°y
represent changes in the e±ciency of production as opposed to technological change.
With regard to growth accelerations only high income countries grow faster because
of technological change, low income countries rely completely on catch-up growth, i.
e. the application of existing technologies that serve to increase the e±ciency of pro-
duction. In phases of decelerating growth changes in technological progress become
unimportant even for high income countries. The present analysis, too, points to
an asymmetry between growth accelerations and decelerations: Capital deepening is
more important around growth decelerations than around accelerations. In all types
of countries growth accelerations tend to happen at lower levels of e±ciency than de-
celerations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the analysis more thoroughly
with the existing literature. In Section 3 the statistical method used to calculate the
growth regime changes is described. In Section 4 the nonparametric growth account-
ing analysis follows. Section 5 deals with the robustness of the results before section
6 concludes.
1 Jones and Olken (2005) use a minimum duration of ¯ve years.
32 Review of Related Literature
Starting with the seminal contributions by Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992), the majority of empirical growth studies has tried to uncover the sources
of growth by means of cross-country growth regressions. Typically, the average growth
rate of per capita income over several decades for a large number of countries is re-
gressed on variables thought to a®ect growth or the steady-state output of countries.
Examples are the investment or government expenditure shares, population growth
rates, variables related to education, trade openness or the quality of institutions.
In addition to these variables the initial period per capita income is included to ac-
count for conditional convergence of countries. Following the contribution by Islam
(1995) the cross-country growth regression approach has subsequently been extended
to panel data. A major problem of these growth regressions is their fragility: depend-
ing on the exact model speci¯cation with regard to sample period, sample coverage
or growth correlates the signi¯cance of variables varies (Levine and Renelt (1992),
Pritchett (2006)). Some part of the fragility of growth regressions can be explained by
the (in-)stability of growth rates and correlates: whereas growth rates are highly in-
stable across periods, in particular in developing countries, growth correlates exhibit a
high degree of persistence (Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers (1993)). Pritch-
ett (2000) elaborates on this point and shows that the evolution of GDP per capita
in most countries is not characterized by a single exponential trend but rather by a
multitude of structural breaks and growth episodes. Therefore, instead of focusing on
explaining the average growth rate of countries he suggests to focus on three questions
related to the observed structural breaks: What drives accelerations and decelerations
of growth? What happens with growth after major policy reforms? Why do some
countries deal with shocks so much better than others? The resulting literature on
growth transitions has so far quite strictly adhered to this program.
An essential ingredient in the analysis of growth transitions as suggested by Pritch-
ett (2000) is the de¯nition of growth spells, i. e. periods during which the growth
rate remains reasonably stable. There are three di®erent approaches that have been
used in the literature: the episodic approach, the threshold approach and the statis-
tical approach. The episodic approach, which has been employed by Rodrik (1999)
or Sahay and Goyal (2006), compares a su±ciently long (e.g. 10 or 15 years) period
of high growth with a su±ciently long period of low growth. The periods of growth
are determined by relying on some kind of a priori knowledge or on the calculation of
average growth rates over a de¯ned number of years. The threshold approach is based
solely on economic criteria. A time period is classi¯ed as a low or high growth spell
4if the growth rates during this period remain above or below a certain magnitude.
For instance, Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) de¯ne a growth acceleration
to be a period of at least 8 years during which the growth rate exceeds the previously
experienced growth rate in a country by at least two percentage points and is in ab-
solute terms at least 3.5 percent. Moreover, only periods ending with higher income
per capital than ever before qualify for growth accelerations. The statistical approach
amounts to testing a time series for the presence of structural breaks. In the growth
context this approach has been pioneered by Ben-David and Papell (1998), who apply
tests allowing for only one structural break point in a time series. The econometric
method suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) allows for the presence of multiple
structural breaks and has subsequently been applied for example by Jones and Olken
(2005). The literature features also combinations of the di®erent methods. Berg, Os-
try, and Zettelmeyer (2006), for instance, combine the threshold and the statistical
approach to de¯ne a growth spell.
Once the growth spells are identi¯ed, essentially three di®erent methods are used
to analyze the research questions proposed by Pritchett (2000). Rodrik (1999) focuses
on the question why some countries respond to shocks so much more quickly than
others. To that end he uses regression techniques resembling cross-country growth
regressions, but using the di®erences in the growth rates between growth regimes as
the dependent variable. A second approach that focuses on the e®ect of major pol-
icy changes analyzes the bivariate relationship between certain variables and di®erent
growth regimes. For instance, if the conjecture is that low US interest rates are con-
ducive to high growth performances and if the US interest rate di®ers signi¯cantly
between high growth and low growth regimes, the conjecture is seen to be con¯rmed
(Sahay and Goyal (2006)). A third approach draws on microeconometric methods on
discrete choice and duration analysis to determine factors initiating growth transitions
or sustaining growth regimes. Based on observables such as the investment rates, ex-
ternal shocks or political institutions either the likelihood of a certain kind of growth
spell or the likely duration of a growth spell is derived. A large number of papers
has implemented a probit-type analysis. Among them are Hausmann, Pritchett, and
Rodrik (2005), Dovern and Nunnenkamp (2006), Becker and Mauro (2006) and Haus-
mann, Rodriguez, and Wagner (2006). Duration analysis has been employed by Berg,
Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006).
The contribution by Jones and Olken (2005) is a contribution to the literature on
growth transitions that uses a statistical approach to determine structural break points
in the GDP per capita time series. It is unique in the sense that it applies growth
5accounting before turning to a comparison of the proximate causes of growth across
high and low growth regimes. As an alternative to traditional growth accounting a
nonparametric approach to growth accounting based on data envelopment analysis
(DEA) has been suggested in the literature. DEA as a tool of macroeconomic analysis
has been introduced by FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994) to analyze pro-
ductivity growth in OECD countries during the time period from 1979 to 1988. The
authors decompose observed changes in productivity into changes in e±ciency and
technological change,2 and ¯nd that productivity growth in the researched period is
mainly attributable to technological change originating from the USA. Subsequently,
these kinds of decomposition have become popular to reassess the relative importance
of productivity growth in the Asian context (Cook and Uchida (2002), KrÄ uger, Cant-
ner, and Hanusch (2000)).
Kumar and Russel (2002) extend the DEA analysis to allow for growth accounting.
The extension is based on the assumption of constant returns to scale and allows to
determine how much of a change in growth rates between periods can be attributed to
e±ciency changes, technological changes and changes in factor accumulation.3 DEA
growth accounting results are usually used to determine the responsible factors for
the wide di®erences that are observed in labor productivity across countries. The
main instrument for this analysis is the use of counterfactual distributions of labor
productivity. Kumar and Russel (2002) have started this type of analysis, which was
subsequently extended to include more input factors or more broadly de¯ned input fac-
tors of production or to refer to di®erent time periods (Henderson and Russell (2005),
Badunenko, Henderson, and Zelenyuk (2005) and Salinas-Jimenez, Alvarez-Ayuso,
and Delgado-Rogriguez (2006)). The analysis has also been extended to account for
statistical properties of the calculations (En°o and Hjertstrand (2006)) or to include
the calculation of an intertemporal DEA frontier (Henderson and Russell (2005), En-
°o and Hjertstrand (2006), Los and Timmer (2005)). So far, no consensus has been
achieved on which factor is the driving force for the observed di®erences in labor pro-
ductivity.
In terms of the reviewed literature the contribution of this paper can be integrated
as follows. The statistical approach is used to determine episodes of high and low
growth. Nonparametric growth accounting is applied to derive the proximate causes
of growth regime changes. The results of high growth and low growth regimes will
2 The e±ciency changes are further decomposed into pure e±ciency and scale e±ciency changes.
3 The original decomposition uses only capital and labor as inputs, but has subsequently been
extended to incorporate human capital as well (Henderson and Russell (2005)).
6be compared so that this method is most closely related to the bivariate relationship
method as described above.
3 Identifying Structural Breaks in Growth Series
3.1 Methodological considerations
The aim of the following section is to determine whether the average growth rate in
countries has changed signi¯cantly over the years and if so in which years. In order
to derive these structural breaks the econometric method proposed by Bai and Per-
ron (1998, 2003) is used. The intuition for the method is straightforward: In a ¯rst
step the optimal timing of a given number of structural break points (up to a maxi-
mum number of allowed breaks) is derived by minimizing the sum of squared residuals
resulting from a regression of the actual growth rate on the average growth rate dur-
ing the speci¯ed growth regimes. In a second step a sequential testing procedure is
implemented to determine the required number of break points. Starting from the
hypothesis that the time series contains no structural break at all, the test opts for
the introduction of an additional break point whenever the resulting reduction in the
sum of squared residuals is su±ciently large as indicated by the relevant asymptotic
distribution of the test statistic. This sequential test is repeated until it no longer
decides in favor of introducing an additional break.
Let gt denote the annual growth rate of income per capita expressed in purchasing
power parity, ¯i the mean growth rate during growth regime i and "t a disturbance
term drawn from possibly di®erent distributions across growth regimes. The assumed
data-generating process takes the following form:
gt = ¯i + "t: (1)
Assume in a ¯rst step that the number of structural breaks in the time series is known.
Consider a time series containing m structural breaks, i. e. m+1 growth regimes. The
break points are denoted (T1;:::;Tm), whereby the actual break that initiates growth
regime i (1 6 i 6 m+1) occurs after the completion of period Ti¡1. The new growth
regime lasts until period Ti.4 Between breakpoints, a minimum distance of h periods
is imposed. The total sum of squared residuals for the m-partition (T1;:::;Tm) of the
4 When T periods are observed, the convention T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T is used.






[gt ¡ ¯i]2: (2)
The estimated break points (^ T1;:::; ^ Tm) are chosen such that ST is minimized subject
to the minimum distance h between break points. The break point estimator is thus
a global minimizer of the objective function and can be conveniently determined by
an algorithm based on least squares residuals and a dynamic programming approach.
Given a matrix which contains the sum of squared residuals for every conceivable




[SSR(Tm¡1;j) + SSR(j + 1;T)]: (3)
SSR(Tr;n) denotes the sum of squared residuals associated with the optimal partition
of the time series containing r breaks and using the ¯rst n observations, SSR(j+1;T)
denotes the sum of squared residuals resulting from a partition starting in (j +1) and
lasting until T. The procedure starts by evaluating optimal one-break partitions. The
earliest possible break date is period h and the break has to occur the latest in T ¡h
to accommodate the minimum duration h of a growth spell. These optimal one-break
partitions are stored. For a two-break partition, the earliest possible ending date of
growth regime 2 is 2h, whereas the latest admissible ending date is again T ¡ h. For
each admissible ending date of growth regime 2, the procedure determines the mini-
mum sum of squared residuals that can be achieved by inserting one of the optimal
one-break partitions. This search is continued sequentially until m breaks are accom-
modated.5
The recursive procedure is able to determine the optimal break points only under
the condition that the total number of break points in the time series is known. Of
course, in the actual problem the number of break points is unknown. Therefore, test
statistics are required that assist with deriving the correct number of break points.
In principle, di®erent test statistics can be used. Bai and Perron (1998) recommend
to use the supFT(` + 1j`) approach, which tests the null hypothesis of the time series
containing (` + 1) breaks against the alternative of the time series containing only `
breaks. The approach is based on the calculation of the supFT test statistic. The
supF-test considers the null hypothesis of no structural break (m = 0) versus the
alternative hypothesis of m = k structural breaks. A conventional F-statistic testing
5 For a detailed description regarding the empirical implementation of the Bai-Perron method-
ology, see Bai and Perron (2003) and Appendix A.





T ¡ (k + 1)
k
¶
^ ¯0R0(R^ V (^ ¯)R0)¡1R^ ¯: (4)
^ ¯ is a vector containing the estimated mean growth rates for each growth regime, ^ V (^ ¯)
is the estimated and if necessary robust covariance matrix of ^ ¯ and R is the linear
restriction matrix such that (R¯)0 = (¯1¡¯2;:::;¯k¡¯k+1). ¸i is de¯ned as Ti=T and
is necessary to derive the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. The supFT test
statistic is the supremum of all admissible FT(¸1;:::;¸k)-statistics. However, if the
break points of the time series are already known, this test statistic is asymptotically
equivalent to
supFT(k) = FT(^ ¸1;:::; ^ ¸k); (5)
i. e. the resulting F-statistic using the calculated break points. The asymptotic dis-
tribution of the supFT(k) test statistic depends on the number of break points as well
as on the minimum duration of a growth regime relative to the entire time period
under consideration, i. e. ² = h=T.6 ² is referred to as the trimming parameter of the
estimation.7
Suppose that the presence of ` break points in the time series is con¯rmed. The
supFT(` + 1j`) proceeds by testing each growth regime for the presence of an addi-
tional structural break. Hence, a new structural break is introduced in each of the
(` + 1) growth regimes and the resulting supFT statistic for k = 1 is calculated.8
Then the overall maximum value of all supFT test statistics across regimes is selected
and compared to the critical values derived by Bai and Perron (2003). A large test
statistic indicates that an additional break point signi¯cantly improves the ¯t of the
model and should therefore be introduced.9 The testing procedure starts from testing
zero against one break point. Then the number of breakpoints is increased one by one
until the supFT(` + 1j`) test fails to reject the null hypothesis of ` breaks.
Alternatively, the number of break points can be determined by using the Bayesian
6 It is also possible to estimate breakpoints in the presence of several regressors. Then the
distribution of the test statistics additionally depends on the number of regressors.
7 The limiting distributions of the test statistics have only been derived for situations in which
the global sum of squared residuals is minimized. This needs not be the case in a sequential
procedure. However, Bai and Perron (1998) argue that the limiting distributions of all tests
are the same in the sequential setup because the rate of convergence remains unchanged.
8 A new breakpoint can only be introduced if the distance between the two endpoints of a growth
regime are far enough from each other, i. e. at least 2h periods from each other. Otherwise,
no breakpoint is introduced and the supFT statistic is assumed to be zero.
9 The asymptotic distributions of all tests in this section depend on the trimming parameter
and are only determined in terms of ¸i.










where ^ e is the vector of estimated residuals. If the series contains k break points,
(k + 1) average growth rates in the growth regimes are estimated (see equation (1)),
hence the factor (k+1) in the second term. Denote by M the highest number of break
points allowed in the time series. The optimal number of break points k¤ minimizes
the BIC, i. e.
k¤ = argmink6MBIC(k): (7)
The BIC-criterion performs reasonably well in the absence of serial correlation. How-
ever, it tends to opt for too many breaks in the presence of autocorrelation (Bai and
Perron (2003)).
Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006) use the so called double maximum test to
derive the number of growth regime changes. The double maximum test tests the
null hypothesis of no structural break versus the alternative of an unknown number
of structural breaks up to an upper bound of M. The (asymptotic) test statistic also
rests upon the supFT statistic and is de¯ned as
UDmaxFT = max
16k6M
FT(^ ¸1;:::; ^ ¸k): (8)
The testing procedure resembles that of the supFT(`j` + 1) test: Instead of applying
the supFT(`+1j`)-test in each growth regime, Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006) ap-
ply the double maximum test in each growth regime. As long as the test indicates that
the null of no break should be rejected, they introduce an additional break into the
tested growth regime. This procedure ¯nds more break points than the supFT(`+1j`)
procedure because it is easier to achieve a seizable reduction in the sum of squared
residuals by introducing several additional breaks than by introducing exactly one
additional break.
In a recent simulation study Bai and Perron (2004) compare the adequacy of dif-
ferent testing strategies in ¯nite samples and in the presence of autocorrelation and/or
heteroscedasticity. They show that even though the BIC works reasonably well in
the absence of autocorrelation, sequential methods are still preferable. The preferred
strategy is to ¯rst use the double maximum test in order to determine the presence
of at least one break and then apply the supFT(` + 1j`)-test to determine the actual
number of breaks. This testing procedure is preferred to the original supFT(` + 1j`)-
10testing procedure because the power of the double maximum test is almost as high as
the power of a test of no breaks versus the alternative hypothesis specifying the true
number of breaks. If the true number of breaks were known, the supFT-test would of
course be preferable. Bai and Perron (2004) also recommend to correct { if present {
for heteroscedasticiy and serial correlation in the data to further increase the power
of the tests.
3.2 Estimation Strategy and Data
In light of the preceding discussion the combined double maximum supFT(` + 1j`)
testing procedure is used to determine the structural breaks in the growth rate series.
The growth rates of per capita income expressed in purchasing power parity are ob-
tained from the Penn World Tables version 6.2 (PWT 6.2).10 Across growth regimes
separate covariance matrices are estimated so as to control for potential heteroscedas-
ticity. The Breusch-Godfrey test is used to verify the absence of autocorrelation.
If there are indications for autocorrelation in a time series, the estimation of break
points is repeated using the HAC covariance matrix for each growth regime.11 A
growth regime is required to last for at least ten years in order to ensure that growth
regimes changes and not only standard business cycles are captured. This requirement
automatically limits the maximum number of breaks to four since the longest data
series run from 1950 to 2004. With regard to the sample the following choices were
10 GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in PWT 6.2 is expressed in year 2000 international
dollars, once de°ated by a ¯xed-base Laspeyres de°ator (RGDPL) and once de°ated by a
chain de°ator (RGDPCH). For time series analysis Summers and Heston (1991) recommand
using the chain de°ated GDP series. Despite the need to switch to ¯xed-base variables later on
due to the non-availability of investment as a chain de°ated series, I follow this advice in this
section because the time series under consideration are very long and relative prices for the
di®erent components of GDP have changed (Summers and Heston (1991)). Consequently, the
time series relying on the Laspeyres index are su®ering from a substitution bias, which renders
reported growth rates far from the base year unreliable and thus unsuitable to determine
structural break points. To clarify the issue, suppose in country j the price of investment
goods continuously fell from 1950 to 2000. If the country steadily increased its capital stock
it follows that GDP at the beginning of the time series grew faster than captured by the
Laspeyres growth rates because the price of investment goods was higher in the 1950s than in
2000. Hence, GDP growth using the Laspeyres de°ator is understated, which might result in
missing structural break points in the growth rate series (Cf. Nuxoll (1994), Nordhaus (2005),
Summers and Heston (1991), and Schreyer (2004) for detailed considerations of substitution
bias and Gerschenkron e®ects.). Therefore, the chain de°ated series of GDP is used for the
determination of structural breaks, thus ensuring that the correct break points are found.
The break points will than later on be used in the production frontier analysis even though
the latter uses ¯xed-base de°ated variables. The results of this paper do not hinge on this
decision. The calculations have also been carried out using the Laspeyres de°ated GDP for
the determination of structural break points. While the break points are somewhat di®erent,
the overall results remain unchanged. Results are available on request.
11 Autocorrelation is only an issue for 13 of the 105 countries at a signi¯cance level of 5 %.
The HAC variance estimator was not generally used, because it is only correct asymptotically
whereas a data segment contains only a comparatively small number of observations.
11made: only countries that were already available in the Penn World Tables version 6.1
were used, because many of the additional countries introduced in version 6.2 su®er
from implausibly high historical levels of income.12 To ensure su±cient data for the
calculation of structural breaks the minimum number of data points has been set to
30. Moreover, following Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) only countries with
a population exceeding one million in the ¯nal year of available data are considered.
Instead of the united Germany, for which not enough data points are available, data
for the former West Germany between 1950 and 1989 has been included. These rules
leave 105 countries for the analysis.
3.3 Results
Upon implementation a total number of 90 breaks is found in the included 105 coun-
tries.13 As expected, the number of breaks exceeds that of Jones and Olken (2005),
who use the less sensitive supFT(`+1j`) testing procedure, but falls below the number
of breaks found by Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006), who rely on multiple appli-
cations of the double maximum test for similar samples. The breaks are classi¯ed
as upbreaks or downbreaks as follows: if the average growth rate after a breakpoint
is higher than before, the break is named an upbreak, otherwise a downbreak. The
terms growth accelerations and growth decelerations are used interchangeably with
upbreaks and downbreaks.14 Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the calcu-
lated structural breaks.
The statistics indicate that downbreaks account for 62% of all breaks and are thus
more common than upbreaks. The upper part of Table 1 shows that structural breaks
prevail in all regions of the world: 19 of the breaks can be found in Africa, 19 in Asia,
23 in Europe, 16 in North America, 11 in South America and 2 in Oceania. The mid-
dle part of Table 1 gives the impression that structural breaks happened in particular
in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the detected breaks in the 1950s and 2000s are low
because our procedure requires the ¯rst and the last growth regime to last for at least
ten years, e®ectively allowing the ¯rst break point in 1959 and the last break point
in 1994 if a country has the longest conceivable series going back to 1950 and lasting
until 2004. Moreover 37 time series start only in 1960 or later, thus further limiting
12 This fact is pointed out by the Center for International Comparisons in the notes accompanying
the launch of PWT 6.2.
13 The calculations were carried out in Stata. I implemented the Bai-Perron procedure following
existing implementations in RATS and GAUSS.
14 Other authors in this literature distinguish between statistically signi¯cant breakpoints and
growth accelerations and decelerations. Cf. for example Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik
(2005) or Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006).
12Table 1: Summary Statistics for Structural Breaks
Structural Breaks by Region





of breaks 90 19 19 23 16 11 2
Upbreaks 34 7 9 6 7 4 1
Downbreaks 56 12 10 17 9 7 1
Structural Breaks by Decade
Total 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Total number
of breaks 90 3 15 35 23 14
Upbreaks 34 3 10 4 7 10
Downbreaks 56 5 31 16 4
Structural Breaks by Initial Income
Total High Income Middle Income Low Income
Total number of
breaks 90 27 22 41
Upbreaks 34 4 6 24
Downbreaks 56 23 16 17
The structural breaks are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology described in the text. The
minimum duration of a growth spell equals 10 years, the trimming parameter follows from the
number of observations, the size of the tests is 10 %. Upbreaks are those breaks where the
growth rate in the regime after the break exceeds the growth rate in the regime before the break.
Downbreaks are de¯ned conversely.
13the number of structural breaks that can be found in the 1960s. Despite these reser-
vations regarding the relative importance of structural breaks in di®erent decades,
the large number of downbreaks recorded in the 1970s supports the hypothesis of a
major productivity slowdown in industrialized countries during that era. The fact
that 26 of 31 downbreaks during that era happened in Europe and North America,
the regions where most of the industrialized countries are found, further corroborates
this hypothesis. In the lower part of Table 1 the structural breaks are classi¯ed by the
stage of development of the respective countries in the year preceding the break. Since
the sample period comprises more than 50 years a dynamic de¯nition of the state of
development is used. A static de¯nition would not be able to account for countries like
Taiwan, Ireland, Japan or Korea, that have developed rapidly over the last decades
and hence changed positions. The de¯nition applied in this study is similar to one
suggested by Becker and Mauro (2006). All countries that have at least half of the US
per capita income belong to the high income countries. The middle income countries
comprise all countries with an income per capita that is at least as high as one half of
the highest per capita income of the non-high income countries. All other countries
are classi¯ed as low income countries. Upbreaks happen mainly in countries with rel-
atively low income while downbreaks are more evenly distributed across all levels of
development. Unlike commonly assumed positive growth experiences are not limited
to Asia and Latin America, but quite a large number of upbreaks happen in Africa,
a continent that is traditionally linked with abysmal growth records. According to
these numbers low income countries are not locked in growth traps. Rather they have
a problem with sustaining growth.
Figure 1 contains examples of structural breaks. The log of the purchasing power
parity income per capita is plotted against time for China, Mexico and Portugal to il-
lustrate that the determined break points do indeed coincide with major policy changes
or other remarkable events. The example of Poland serves to outline the merits and
limits of the chosen approach. A table containing all calculated break points as well as
the average growth rates during the di®erent growth regimes can be found in appendix
B.
For China, an upbreak is detected in 1978. This breakpoint coincides with Deng
Xiaoping's ascension and the start of economic reforms such as the liberalization of
agriculture and the opening of the economy. Similarily, the low growth regime in Mex-
ico starting in 1982 can be linked to a severe currency crisis starting in that year. As
far as Portugal is concerned, the high growth regime starting in 1974 can be related
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Figure 1: Examples of Structural Breaks
the political system and far reaching economic changes. Finally, a downbreak in 1980
and an upbreak in 1992 is recorded for Poland. The upbreak coincides with Poland
being the ¯rst country to return to a growth path after the collapse of the communist
system. The break in 1980 is in line with the economic crisis started by the attempt
to increase meat prices in 1980. However, a look at the graph indicates that "better"
turning points might have been 1978, 1982 and 1992. The Bai-Perron-method, how-
ever, is unable to detect these turning points due to the requirement that a growth
regime has to last for at least 10 years. While this requirement prevents a confusion
of business cycle movements with growth regime movements, it also implies that the
turning points found by the procedure are not turning points that would have been
chosen by mere inspection of the series if there are several turning points in the neigh-
borhood of each other.
4 Nonparametric Growth Accounting
In this section the nonparametric approach to growth accounting is described and
implemented. In the ¯rst subsection the traditional growth accounting methodology
and its shortcomings are described so as to motivate the use of the nonparametric
15approach. A detailed depiction of DEA and the accounting decomposition follows.
After a short description of the data used the results of DEA growth accounting are
presented.15
4.1 Traditional Growth Accounting and Its Shortcomings
Standard growth accounting is based on an aggregate production function that exhibits
constant returns to scale in the (rival) input factors and Hicks-neutral technological
change.16 As a minimum, the aggregate physical capital stock in use and the aggregate
labor force in use are considered as factor inputs.17 Often the labor force is weighted
by some measure of human capital in order to obtain a measure of the quality adjusted
workforce. Assume the following simple aggregate production function
Y = AF(K;L); (9)
where Y is the aggregate output of the economy, A represents the level of technology,
K is the aggregate physical capital stock in use and L is aggregate labor used. Taking
logarithms and di®erentiating equation (9) with respect to time results in the well
known growth accounting formula







gx denotes the growth rate of x, Fx is the derivative of the production function with
respect to x, with x 2 fL;K;Y;Ag. The logic of growth accounting is straightforward:
The growth of inputs that occurs within a period is weighted by the respective elastic-
ities over the same period yielding the output growth that can be attributed to factor
accumulation. In the presence of competitive markets and constant returns to scale
with respect to factor inputs the elasticities are equal to the respective factor shares.
Hicks neutral technological progress is derived as the di®erence between the observed
growth rate of output and the growth that can be attributed to the use of rival inputs.
15 Both standard growth accounting and nonparametric growth accounting rely on the existence
of aggregate factor inputs, aggregate outputs and aggregate production functions and are
vulnerable to the Cambridge capital theory controversies and aggregation problems per se. In
the Cambridge debate the logic of treating a quantity expressed in value terms (i. e. the capital
stock) in the same way as other aggregate quantities expressed in physical terms (i. e. labor)
is questioned. The aggregation literature argues that aggregate quantities and production
functions only exist under very restrictive conditions which are not met in reality. An analysis
of these objections is beyond the scope of this paper. A comprehensive survey of this issue can
be found in Felipe and Fisher (2003).
16 Barro (2003) describes how growth accounting can be interpreted assuming labor augmenting
technological change. This, however, is rarely done.
17 More precisely, it should be the services derived from the capital stock and labor in use, i. e.
hours worked, that should enter the production function. The stock values are used due to
lack of better data.
16Following the majority of growth accounting studies Jones and Olken (2005) specify
the production technology to be Cobb-Douglas and assume the capital share to equal
1=3.
As the exposition above has clari¯ed the analysis by Jones and Olken (2005) is
based on a multitude of assumptions which are not beyond dispute. To reiterate, the
most important assumptions are the following: The aggregate production function is
assumed to be of the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas form implying an elas-
ticity of substitution between factors of one. Production takes place in a competitive
environment, which is re°ected in the use of factor shares as output elasticities. All
growth that is not explained by factor accumulation is interpreted as technological
change, thus e®ectively assuming that all countries produce e±ciently, i. e. on the
borders of their production possibility sets.
Going through the assumptions one by one it will become clear that they are
contestable but at the same time determine the growth accounting results. Meth-
ods relying on less assumptions are preferable and necessary for robustness checks.
The assumption of constant returns to scale is convenient, but if endogenous growth
theory (Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992)) is to be believed, the aggregate
production function is characterized by increasing returns to scale. The assumption
of Hicks-neutral technological change is assailable on two grounds: First, steady state
growth requires technological progress to be labor-augmenting. Steady state growth
and Hicks-neutral technological progress are only compatible in the special case of
a Cobb-Douglas production function (Barro (2003)). However, Du®y and Papageor-
giou (2000) ¯nd that aggregate production functions are not well characterized by
the Cobb-Douglas form. Moreover, a large literature exists that argues in favor of
skill-biased technological change indicating that not all factors pro¯t equally from
technological change.18 Regarding the approximation of output elasticities with fac-
tor shares this approximation is only valid in a competitive environment. Yet, market
power and externalities exist. Furthermore, measured factor shares do not properly
account for self-employment (Crafts (2003)). These issues make it likely that factor
shares do not properly re°ect output elasticities. Often this issue is dealt with by
imposing constant factor shares at an appropriately deemed number following Gollin
(2002), who argues that appropriately adjusted labor shares are indeed constant over
time and across countries. Yet, other contributions show that labor and capital shares
have not been constant in the past so that the jury on this issue is still out (Harrison
18 Examples of this literature include Acemoglu (1998, 2002), Caselli (1999), Machin and
Van Reenen (1998), Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), and Card and DiNardo (2002).
17(2002), Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps (1997)). However, the most serious short-
coming is the assumption of the unit elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor, which is embodied in the Cobb-Douglas production function. A high elastic-
ity of substitution between capital and labor implies that capital deepening alone is
su±cient to increase output by a large amount. When the elasticity of substitution
decreases ceteris paribus, the growth attributable to total factor productivity growth
increases ceteris paribus. In this sense, the results of growth accounting are predeter-
mined by the assumed production function (Cf. Rodrik (1997) and Nelson (1973)).
The assumption of a unit elasticity of substitution is often justi¯ed by the observa-
tion that despite capital deepening the capital share and thus the marginal product
of capital have remained approximately constant. However, this case is observation-
ally equivalent to a case where the diminishing returns of capital are cushioned by
labor-saving technical change. Any growth accounting results are therefore subject to
considerable doubt (Rodrik (1997)).
Nonparametric growth accounting avoids most of the mentioned debatable assump-
tions. It does not require the speci¯cation of a production technology, thus leaving
the nature of technological progress and the magnitude of the elasticity of substitu-
tion between labor and capital to be determined by the data. It is entirely based
on quantity measures so that no assumptions with respect to optimizing behavior,
market structures, institutions and market imperfections are involved. It takes into
account the possibility of ine±cient production and decomposes the black box "total
factor productivity change" into changes in e±ciency and technological change. The
only questionable assumption that is maintained is constant returns to scale.19
4.2 Nonparametric growth accounting
4.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
Data envelopment analysis in its original form allows measuring the e±ciency of pro-
duction for decision-making units with multiple inputs and outputs in the absence
of market prices. In order to achieve the e±ciency measurement the observed input-
output bundles of the decision making units are used to construct a benchmark technol-
19 Growth accounting based on stochastic frontier analysis was considered as an alternative to
the chosen approach based on DEA. Like the DEA approach, it allows the decomposition of
productivity into e±ciency and technology. Moreover, it acknowledges the fact that random
shocks outside the control of producers can a®ect output. However, in a long panel like in this
article technological change and time-varying e±ciency levels have to be allowed for. In the
context of stochastic frontiers, this is only possible by severely restricting the evolution of the
e±ciency term such that the time path is either equal across countries or smooth over time
(Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)). Neither assumption is suited for an analysis that focuses on
the behavior of growth components in the presence of structural breaks.
18ogy under fairly general assumptions. Basically the data is enveloped in the "tightest
¯tting" convex cone, and the upper boundary of this set represents the best-practice
production frontier. The e±ciency of a decision making unit is measured with ref-
erence to the thus de¯ned benchmark technology. The decision making units in this
article are the individual countries.
The following weak assumptions are used for the construction of the benchmark
technology: First, all actually observed input-output-combinations are feasible. Sec-
ond, the production possibility set is a convex cone. Third, inputs as well as outputs
are freely disposable. Forth, the production technology exhibits constant returns to
scale.20 As in section 4.1 aggregate physical capital in use (K) and aggregate labor
in use (L) are the factor inputs by means of which the single aggregate output good
in the economy (Y ) is produced.21 Ignoring for the moment the intertemporal nature
of the problem and denoting the countries (decision making units) by subscript j, the
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In words, all input-output bundles (Y;K;L) that are convex combinations of observed
input-output bundles make up the production possibility set. The upper boundary of
this set represents the best-practice production / technology frontier. In the following
the terms best practice production frontier and world technology frontier will be used
interchangeably (and abbreviated by technology frontier), even though it is likely that
the true world technology frontier envelops more input-output bundles than the best-
practice frontier does. This will always be the case if in reality the frontier-de¯ning
decision making units do not operate fully e±ciently.22
20 It is not necessary to assume constant returns to scale in DEA analysis. Assuming varying
or non-increasing returns to scale requires only slightly di®erent restrictions on the activity
levels, which are denoted by ¹ later on. However, the assumption of constant returns to scale
is exploited in the following growth accounting decomposition (Kumar and Russel (2002) and
Ray (2004)).
21 It is debateable whether in an economy-wide context aggregate physical capital and labor in
use or available should be used. Unemployment of a factor can be interpreted as a source of
ine±ciency in itself. Usually, however, in analogy to the microeconomic background of DEA
analysis only the employed factors are taken as inputs. I adopt this approach, being aware that
the e±ciency of production in the economy is a somewhat narrower concept than the e±ciency
of the whole economy if idle resources were taken into account as well.
22 En°o and Hjertstrand (2006) examine the amount of bias that is introduced by ignoring the
di®erence between best practice and world technology frontier. While the best practice frontier
is indeed a downwards biased version of the world technology frontier correcting the bias does
not change qualitative results.
19One way to extend DEA analysis intertemporally is to simply calculate world tech-
nology frontiers in each time period independently. In this case equation (11) would
not change except for the need to add a time subscript. This approach has a serious
disadvantage: the world technology frontier can implode if for example the frontier
de¯ning countries experience an economic collapse. Yet, it is di±cult to imagine events
where the world would forget or unlearn previously known production possibilities. It
is important here to distinguish between observed production and production pos-
sibilities. While many events can prevent countries from actually producing on the
technology frontier not many events are conceivable where the "blueprint" of how to
produce e±ciently is lost once it has been discovered. For this reason an intertemporal
variant of DEA that precludes technological regress is preferred.23 E®ectively, tech-
nological regress can be prevented by taking into account all input-output bundles
that have ever been observed until period t when calculating the production frontier
in period t (Diewert (1980), Henderson and Russell (2005)). Equation (11) therefore
becomes


















Typically, many of the decision making units do not produce on the boundaries
of the technology set. If a decision making unit does not produce on the technology
frontier it is ine±cient in that the same amount of output could be produced by less
input. The amount of ine±ciency is captured by the Farrell output-based measure of
technical e±ciency.24 The technical e±ciency (TE) of country j at time t is de¯ned









The e±ciency index is the inverse of the maximal amount by which output Yjt could
be expanded while still remaining technically feasible and while still requiring the
23 However, something akin to technological regress is quite plausible in the presence of behavioral
changes. Consider e. g. the recent interest in environment protection. E®ective environment
protection might result in a production possibility set where the same amount of inputs brings
about less output. The assumption in this paper is that this kind of behavior is not yet
important, which is partly corroborated by the ever increasing production possibilities in high
income countries.
24 The literature uses the Farrell output-based measure inconsistently in that it is sometimes
de¯ned as below, i. e. as Á or alternatively as
1
Á (Cf. e. g. Grosskopf (1993) for the latter
de¯nition). Farrell himself only de¯nes the input-based measure of technical e±ciency in this
seminal contribution (Farrell (1957)).
20same input quantities Kjt and Ljt. The e±ciency index takes the value 1 if a country
is producing on the world technology frontier. Otherwise, Ájt < 1 holds.25 Formally,
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These e±ciency levels and the activity levels ¹j¿ are reported for every decision making
unit as the output of a DEA analysis.26
4.2.2 Decomposing Productivity Growth
The DEA analysis introduced in the previous section showed how to determine the
e±ciency of production. FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994) showed how to
account for productivity changes over time based on the Malmquist productivity index
(Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982)). Under the assumption of constant returns
to scale Kumar and Russel (2002) decomposed changes in income per worker into
components attributable to e±ciency change, technological change and capital accu-
mulation. This section starts by presenting the originally proposed decomposition by
Kumar and Russel (2002), extends the decomposition to integrate labor force partici-
pation and ¯nally shows how to implement the approach in terms of distance functions.
Since constant returns to scale are assumed the decomposition of changes in in-
come per worker can be derived in the (y;k) space, where k = K=L and y = Y=L, i.
e. capital stock and output per worker if labor in use is measured by the number of
workers. Consider the base period b and the current period c. The world technology
frontiers in the base period and the current period are shown in ¯gure 2.
25 Since the Farrell output-based measure of technical e±ciency is a radial measure of e±ciency,
Á = 1 does not necessarily indicate Pareto-e±cient production. Á only shows whether propor-
tional increases in the output mix given the input mix are possible. It does not capture whether
one component of the output mix could be individually increased more than proportionally
nor does it capture whether reductions of some individual inputs are feasible without a®ecting
output (Ray (2004)). In the present analysis only the input mix question arises.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Nonparametric Growth Accounting
Suppose the economy under consideration produces at point B in the base period
using capital intensity kb and at point C in the current period using capital intensity
kc. Then outputs yb and yc are produced, respectively. By de¯nition, output on the
production frontier for the respective capital intensities is given by ¹ yc(kc) = yc=Ác
and ¹ yb(kb) = yb=Áb, where Á again denotes the e±ciency of production. Income per





















Changes in income per worker as measured by the growth factor of income per worker
are decomposed into changes in e±ciency (¯rst term), changes in technology (second
term) and the e®ect of changes in the capital intensity per worker (third term) via
this identity. Graphically speaking, e±ciency changes are changes in the distance
from, technological changes are shifts of and the e®ect of changes in the capital inten-
sity are movements along the production frontier. In terms of ¯gure 2 the proposed
22decomposition measures technological change by shifts of the frontier at the current
capital intensity - from point I2 to point I3 - and the e®ect of capital accumulation as
movements along the base-period frontier - from point I1 to point I2. Of course the











is equally valid. This time technological change is measured by shifts of the frontier
at the base capital intensity - from point I1 to point I4 - and the e®ect of capital
accumulation as movements along the current-period frontier - from point I4 to point
I3. The choice between equation (16) and (17) is arbitrary. If technological change
is Hicks-neutral, the production frontier shifts by the same amount at each capital
intensity so that the point of measurement does not matter. If, however, technological
change is not Hicks-neutral, the two decompositions yield di®erent results because the
shifts of the technology frontier at di®erent capital intensities varies. Following FÄ are,
Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994) and Kumar and Russel (2002) this ambiguity is
resolved by adopting the "Fisher ideal" decomposition. The Fisher ideal decomposi-



















=: EFF ¢ TECH ¢ KACCUM;
where again the ¯rst term denotes e±ciency change (EFF), the second term techno-
logical change (TECH) and the third term the e®ect of capital deepening (KACCUM).
Since the ultimate objective of the paper is to decompose growth rates around
structural breaks and since the structural breaks were calculated using the growth
rates of income per capita it is necessary to extend equation (18) such that income
per capita is decomposed. Let lfp denote the labor force participation measured as
the number of workers per capita and ~ y income per capita. Since income per capita
is nothing else than income per worker multiplied by the labor force participation it























=: EFF ¢ TECH ¢ KACCUM ¢ LFP: (19)
23Since the only outputs from a DEA analysis are the e±ciency levels Á and the
activity levels ¹ the components of the suggested decomposition have to be expressed
solely in terms of these and input-output measures. To this end, the distance function












The distance function takes the same value as the e±ciency measure Áb and hence
measures the maximal proportional change in outputs required to make (kb;yb) just
feasible in relation to technology at time t. The superscript b indicates the reference
period of the production possibility set, the main advantage of the distance function
over the e±ciency measure. According to the previous section e±ciency in the base
period is the fraction of actual to potential output as de¯ned by the technology frontier.
Hence,







The distance function Dc(kc;yc) is de¯ned analogously. However, in order to cal-
culate the decomposition the additional distance functions Db(kc;yc) and Dc(kb;yb),
i. e. the e±ciency of today's production in reference to tomorrow's technology frontier








In practice, these counterfactual distance functions or e±ciency scores are obtained
by solving two additional linear programs similar to (14). The di®erence is that the
observation that is evaluated is not included in the reference set from which the pro-
duction possibility frontier is derived.28 Altogether, to obtain a decomposition for one
period of growth and one country four linear programming problems have to be solved.
With the distance functions at hand all components of the suggested decomposition
can be derived reverting only to distance functions and data on factor inputs and
outputs. Consider the ¯rst term of equation (18) or (19). By de¯nition, this term is
27 For convenience, subscript i is dropped.
28 A nice exposition dealing with how to calculate these counterfactual distance functions can be


























































































After a description of the data the results of the decomposition around structural
breaks according to equation (19) are reported. The values have been derived in the
following way: Consider a break that occurs in the year t. For every adjacent pair of
years in the ten years before the break and in the ten years after the break the growth
factors of income per capita, labor force participation, e±ciency change, technological
change and changes resulting from capital accumulation are calculated. Based on
these yearly growth factors, the average growth factors over the ten year period before
and the ten year period after the break are derived by taking the geometric average.29
Finally, the overall averages across countries are obtained by taking the arithmetic
average.
29 The order of calculation is reported because the Fisher type indices do not satisfy the circular
test so that the results depend the order of calculation (Battese, Coelli, and Rao (1998), chap.
4.5).
254.3 Data
The data for the nonparametric growth accounting is also taken from the Penn World
Tables version 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006)). Compared to other data
sets the Penn World data has the advantage of being measured in a common set
of prices, thus allowing real international quantity comparisons across countries and
time (Summers and Heston (1991)). Using real quantities is important since growth
accounting and DEA in particular are theoretically based on real quantities. The
Penn World Tables contain data on output per capita and the population number
so that total GDP can be derived. Unlike in section 3 GDP per capita is de°ated
using a Laspeyres index because the data needed for the construction of the capital
stock is only available for a Laspeyres de°ator.30 Aggregate labor used in production
is measured by the number of workers in the population.31 While the number of
workers is an imperfect measure of actual labor used (e. g. due to unemployment),
it nevertheless captures some variation in capacity utilization. This adjustment is
important in an analysis that focuses on medium-term changes in observed growth
rates.32 Total investment per period (I) is derived multiplying the investment rate
with total GDP.33 The capital stock is calculated via the perpetual inventory method
(Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993)) assuming a constant depreciation rate ± of seven
percent. Assuming for the moment that the initial capital stock is known the capital
stock in subsequent periods is speci¯ed by
Kt = (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1 + It: (25)





with gI being the average investment rate34 of the ¯rst ten observations.35
30 In terms of the Penn World table variable names RGDPL is used.
31 Using the Penn World Table variable names the number of workers is derived via RGDPCH ¤
POP=RGDPWOK. For Taiwan the number of workers is extrapolated from 1999 onwards
based on the assumption that the labor force participation rate equals that of 1998.
32 The e®ect of further adjustments for the quality of labor based on human capital are analyzed
as part of the robustness check in section 5.
33 Using the Penn World Table variable names, investment is calculated via KI=100¤RGDPL¤
POP.





35 If gI is negative for the ¯rst ten observations, an investment rate of zero is assumed.
264.4 Results
In this section the preferred nonparametric growth accounting results are presented.
The preferred basic results have been calculated excluding the countries Jordan and
Gabon because the inclusion or exclusion of these countries proved to be quite in°u-
ential.36 Therefore, 88 growth regime changes have been considered in the analysis.
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Figure 3: Prodution Frontiers for 1950, 1975 and 2004
In Figure 3 the calculated production frontiers for the years 1950, 1975 and 2004
are plotted in the (k;y)-space.37 As expected the production possibility set expanded
between 1950 and 2004. The production frontiers are virtually identical at low levels
of capitalization (i.e. low levels of capital per worker). For higher levels of capital-
ization the production frontiers shift outwards indicating technological progress. The
uneven shifts of the production frontiers indicate that technological progress is not
neutral.38 Rather, technological progress bene¯ts predominantly countries that pro-
duce capital-intensively and have high levels of income per capita. These results are
36 Cf. section 5.1.
37 In 1950 and 1975 the last input-output combination has not been observed in the data. It
has been plotted in order to ease the comparison of the di®erent convex production possibility
sets.
38 Neutral technological progress would shift the production frontier equally at each capital in-
tensity.
27similar to those of Kumar and Russel (2002) and Henderson and Russell (2005).
In Table 2 the average growth rates of income per capita in the ten years before
and after growth accelerations are decomposed into the contributions of e±ciency,
technology, capital deepening and labor force participation.39 The third column com-
prises the di®erences in the contributions to growth between the regime changes. The
contributions of e±ciency and technology are summarized as productivity changes,
which correspond loosely to Hicks-neutral technological progress calculated in growth
accounting (see equation (10)).
Before a growth acceleration the average country experiences an annual growth
rate in income per capita of 0:19%. If there were no changes in productivity and
labor force participation the growth rate would be 1:16% owing to capital accumula-
tion. However, productivity and labor force participation contribute negatively to the
overall growth rate, reducing it by 0:87 and 0:07 percentage points, respectively. The
negative contribution of productivity growth is a result of declining e±ciency. After a
growth acceleration the average yearly growth rate of income per capita exceeds 4%,
accelerating by 3:97 percentage points. Productivity change contributes positively
to the higher growth rate, explaining 1.16 percentage points. After the acceleration
changes in e±ciency, too, contribute positively to the observed growth rate. The dif-
ference in percentage points between the growth regimes is 2.28 for e±ciency but only
0.19 for technology. Thus, while technological change occurs somewhat faster after an
acceleration than before, e±ciency change is the major driving force of the increased
productivity. Capital deepening now contributes to the growth rate with 2.14 percent-
age points, almost one percentage point more than before. Labor force participation of
the average country increases markedly after an acceleration. The lower part of Table
2 indicates how much of the increased growth rate can be explained by accelerated
capital accumulation. Depending on whether the contribution of capital accumulation
is calculated using the averages given in Table 2 or using the individual data ¯rst and
averaging afterwards, the contribution amounts to 24:6% or 23:5%. It follows that 75
% of the observed growth rate changes are accounted for by other factors. Produc-
tivity changes alone account for 2:48 of the 3:97 percentage point increase in growth
rates or 62:5% (based on average contributions).
39 The values in one row do not add up exactly, because the original relationship is a product
between growth factors. Focusing on productivity and capital accumulation only, we approx-
imate (1 + gy) = (1 + gprod)(1 + gcap) by gy = gprod + gcap, so that a slight inaccuracy of
gprodgcap is introduced. However, this inaccuracy is of little relevance as long as the growth
rates are small.
28Table 2: Nonparametric Growth Accounting around Growth Accelerations
Before Upbreak After Upbreak Di®erence Between
Growth Regimes
Average Annual Growth Rate of
Income per Capita 0.19 4.16 3.97
Productivity Changes -0.87 1.61 2.48
E±ciency Changes -1.31 0.97 2.28
Technological Changes 0.45 0.64 0.19
Capital Deepening 1.16 2.14 0.98
Changes in Labor Force
Participation -0.07 0.39 0.46
Number of Observations 34 34 34
Contribution to Growth
Capital Accumulation (based on
individual contributions)
23.54 %
Capital Accumulation (based on
average contributions)
24.58 %
Growth accelerations are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology as described in section 3.
The growth rates before and after the structural breaks are the average growth rates in the ten
years preceding and the ten years following the structural break.
In Table 3 the equivalent results for growth decelerations are presented. Growth
decelerations are somewhat larger in magnitude than growth accelerations with the
growth rate of income per capita falling from 4.63 % to 0.14 % between regimes. Both
e±ciency and technology contribute positively to economic growth preceding a down-
break. After a downbreak the contribution of e±ciency change to growth becomes
negative and technological change slows down. The growth contribution of capital
deepening falls from 2.4 to 0.5 percentage points. Despite the deceleration of the
growth rate, labor force participation increases slightly after the regime change, pos-
sibly indicating that survival especially in poor countries has become more di±cult
and requires more people to contribute to household earnings. Focusing once again on
the importance of capital accumulation, the calculations indicate that slower capital
accumulation can account for 40 { 50% of the observed fall in the growth rate. Capital
accumulation is thus quantitatively more important around downbreaks than around
upbreaks. Using the contributions of capital accumulation based on individual con-
tributions, a t-test reveals that the contributions between upbreaks and downbreaks
di®er signi¯cantly from each other at the one percent signi¯cance level.40
40 The t-statistic equals 2.9 and has a p-value of 0.0048. The test assumes unequal variances
across the two samples.
29Table 3: Nonparametric Growth Accounting around Growth Decelerations
Before
Downbreak After Downbreak Di®erence Between
Growth Regimes
Average Annual Growth Rate
of Income per Capita 4.63 0.14 -4.49
Productivity Changes 2.08 -0.62 -2.70
E±ciency Changes 1.39 -0.98 -2.37
Technological Changes 0.69 0.36 -0.33
Capital Deepening 2.40 0.47 -1.92
Changes in Labor Force
Participation 0.12 0.30 0.18
Number of Observations 54 54 54
Contribution to Growth
Capital Accumulation (based on
individual contributions) 49.19 %
Capital Accumulation (based on
average contributions) 42.82 %
Growth decelerations are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology as described in section 3.
The growth rates before and after the structural breaks are the average growth rates in the ten
years preceding and the ten years following the structural break.
Table 4 summarizes the importance of capital accumulation, e±ciency changes
and technological changes for growth accelerations and decelerations depending on
the countries' level of development in the year preceding the structural break. The
state of development is determined as explained in section 3.3. The table indicates
the percentage of growth rate changes between regimes that can be explained by each
growth component. As mentioned in the introduction, capital accumulation is ex-
pected to be more important in developing compared to developed countries based
on the literature on industrialization and poverty traps. The literature on the dif-
fusion of technology41 predicts that rich countries are typically leader countries that
innovate and develop new technologies. Poor countries, on the other hand, bene¯t
mainly from imitating and implementing already discovered technologies. In terms of
the production frontier, rich countries are therefore expected to shift the production
frontier so that technological change should account for some part of their changing
growth rates. Poor countries, on the other hand, are mainly expected to move towards
the technology frontier so that e±ciency changes should be more important.
Focusing on the importance of capital accumulation in phases of accelerating
growth the theoretical considerations are not supported by the empirical ¯ndings.
41 Important contributions are Nelson and Phelps (1966), Krugman (1979), Segerstrom (1991),
and Barro and Sala-i Martin (1997).
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Observations 4 6 24
Downbreaks
E±ciency
Change 40.14% 62.62% 53.84%
Technological
Change 9.71% 7.32% 5.10%
Capital





Observations 22 15 17
The structural breaks are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology as described in section 3.
The contributions to growth indicated in the table are based on the average growth contribution
of each component.
Capital accumulation proves itself most important in high income countries, where it
explains 34% of the growth rate change. In middle and low income countries capital
accumulation only explains roughly one fourth of the growth rate changes. The predic-
tions concerning the di®usion of technology are supported. In high income countries
40% of the accelerating growth rate is explained by faster technological change. E±-
ciency, on the other hand, contributes negatively to the observed growth rate, which
might re°ect problems of adjusting to new technologies or problems of restructuring.
Middle income countries pro¯t much more from e±ciency changes, which explain 46%
of the increased growth rate. Faster technological advances are important, too, though
on a lower scale than in high income countries. Low income countries, on the other
hand, experience slower technological progress in accelerating growth episodes than
before. Growth is primarily driven by improvements in e±ciency, which explain 66%
of the increased growth rate. For low income countries, a strategy aimed at adopting
31existing technology seems to pay o®.
The second part of Table 4 deals with downbreaks. Capital accumulation accounts
for roughly 50% of the lower growth rate in high and low income countries. It is less
important for middle income countries, where only 35% of the growth rate di®erence is
explained by capital accumulation. The negative evolution of productivity in growth
decelerations is mainly due to a worsening of e±ciency in all types of countries. Slower
technological change only accounts for 10% of the growth rate change in high income
countries and even less in middle and low income countries. E±ciency change, on
the other hand, accounts for 40% of the di®erence in growth rates in high income
countries, 63% in middle income countries and 54% in low income countries.
Finally, Table 5 presents the average levels of e±ciency of the countries in the
years preceding an upbreak or a downbreak, respectively. Intuition suggests that
growth accelerations can happen most easily when countries ¯nd themselves far from
the production frontier and have ample easy opportunities to catch up. Downbreaks,
on the other hand, are likely to happen in situations in which increases in e±ciency
become more di±cult to achieve, i. e. at relatively high levels of e±ciency. Table
5 con¯rms this intuition. For instance, if all countries are considered, upbreaks on
average happen at an e±ciency level of 0:54, whereas downbreaks are linked with a
considerably higher e±ciency level of 0:72.
To sum up, the calculations point at the paramount importance of productivity
changes both for the explanation of growth accelerations and decelerations. Upbreaks
and downbreaks are asymmetric events in the sense that decelerations of growth are to
a larger extent driven by capital accumulation changes than accelerations of growth.
The consideration of e±ciency scores and changes supports the idea that high income
countries are innovators whereas low income countries are imitators in terms of the
technology di®usion literature. Moreover, growth accelerations tend to happen when
countries ¯nd themselves at relatively low levels of e±ciency and catching up is there-
fore easier, whereas downbreaks tend to happen at relatively high levels of e±ciency.
4.5 A comparison to the literature
In this section the deviations between my nonparametric growth accounting results
and the results obtained by Jones and Olken (2005) are shortly analyzed. Table 6
summarizes the contributions of capital accumulation and productivity changes to
observed growth rate changes in income per capita as obtained by the di®erent meth-
32Table 5: Average Level of E±ciency Preceding Structural Breaks






Upbreak 0.53 (34) 0.81 (4) 0.67 (6) 0.45 (24)
Downbreak 0.72 (54) 0.84 (22) 0.71 (15) 0.59 (17)
The structural breaks are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology as described in section 3.
The number in parentheses indicates the number of observations available for each category.
ods. In order to ensure as much comparability as possible, the numbers reported for
Jones and Olken (2005) refer to their growth accounting speci¯cation including ad-
justments for labor force participation, but excluding adjustments for human capital
and electricity consumption. However, the calculated contributions of capital accu-
mulation and productivity changes would be similar if other speci¯cations were chosen.
In the chosen growth accounting approach Jones and Olken (2005) decompose the
per capita growth rate changes into the part accounted for by growth in capital stock
per capita (as opposed to this paper using capital per worker), the part accounted
for by changing labor force participation and the part accounted for by Hicks-neutral
technological progress. The resulting explanatory power of capital accumulation to
growth rate changes is low: if the ¯ve years before and after an upbreak are compared,
only seven percent of the growth rate change between regimes can be explained by
capital accumulation. The same is true if the long-run, i. e. the whole duration of a
growth regime, is considered. With regard to downbreaks the respective contributions
of capital are 19% and 25:6%. A comparison of the short-run contributions of capital
to those obtained by nonparametric growth accounting reveals that Jones and Olken's
(2005) contribution of capital is more than 15 percentage points lower both for up-
breaks and for downbreaks. Accordingly, their contributions of productivity changes
are higher.
This paper and the paper by Jones and Olken (2005) di®er both in the deter-
mination of break points and the method of growth accounting. To understand the
in°uence of the growth accounting methods, traditional growth accounting was repli-
cated with the new data and newly calculated structural breaks.42 The contribution
of capital to growth rate changes in the case of upbreaks remains much higher (17.8%)
than the one obtained by Jones and Olken (2005) even though it falls somewhat com-
pared to the nonparametric growth accounting results. For downbreaks the calculated
42 The growth accounting formula in terms of the established notation runs as follows: g~ y =
®gk + glfp + gA. ® is set to 1=3.






































21.8 % 70.5 % 34 31.4 % 71.3 % 54
The contributions of capital accumulation and productivity changes to growth rate changes in
the case of Jones and Olken (2005) are calculated using the averages reported in their Tables 4A
and 4B. The calculations assume that GDP and capital per capita growth rates in the somewhat
smaller labor force participation sample are identical to those observed in the full sample. When
the contributions of capital accumulation and productivity changes to growth rate changes do
not add up to one, changes in labor force participation have occurred (not reported here). All
parametric growth accounting calculations assume a physical capital share of 1/3.
contribution of the capital stock diminishes to 32:7%, a number that is lower than
in the nonparametric growth accounting case but still higher than the one obtained
by Jones and Olken (2005). These results indicate that the use of nonparametric
growth accounting is responsible for some of the increased explanatory power of capi-
tal accumulation.43 Yet, the change of methodology only explains roughly one half of
the di®erences between the results, so that something else has to be of importance, too.
An obvious candidate to explain the di®erences is Jones and Olken (2005)'s use
of capital stock per capita instead of capital stock per worker. Therefore, traditional
growth accounting using the capital stock per capita and the new data has been im-
plemented, too.44 The di®erence between the two growth accounting speci¯cations is
negligible. While the explanatory power of capital accumulation decreases for growth
43 This ¯nding is common. Cf. Henderson and Russell (2005) or Kumar and Russel (2002) as
prominent examples.
44 The growth accounting formula now runs g~ y = ®g~ k +(1¡®)glfp +gA with ~ x representing per
capita values and ® equal to 1=3. Since both this and the previous growth accounting formula
are based on a Cobb Douglas production function using the aggregate capital stock and the
number of workers as factor inputs, the contribution of productivity changes should remain
unchanged. The slight observed changes point at minor inaccuracies in the data base.
34decelerations, it increases for growth accelerations (see last row of Table 6). Since the
remaining data is comparable between the two studies45 and the same method is used
for the construction of the capital stock, a reasonable conjecture is that the di®ering
testing procedures used to determine the structural breaks are partly responsible for
the di®erences in results. It seems unlikely that the length of time before and after a
structural break can account for much of the deviations, because, as Jones and Olken
(2005) show, their results hardly change even when the very long run is considered.
5 Robustness of the Results
In this section the robustness of the results is analyzed from two angles. First, some
considerations regarding the sample choice are reported. Second, the importance of
adjusting labor for quality is considered.
5.1 Choice of sample
Methods based on DEA have the merit of requiring very few assumptions. This
°exibility, however, has the drawback that the calculations are by construction very
sensitive to extreme values and outliers. Therefore, the results of the previous section
should be checked for their robustness. The literature has developed some methods
such as the use of in°uence functions or the order-m approach that help with iden-
tifying potentially atypical observations (Wilson (1993), Simar (2003), and Cazals,
Florens, and Simar (2002)). Unfortunately, the in°uence function approach becomes
computationally prohibitive in larger samples. The order-m approach is well suited
for frontiers involving many observations for a single period. Its implementation is
more di±cult in an intertemporal context such as in this paper, so that the appli-
cation of the order-m approach is left as a future research task. Nevertheless, even
without using a formal method to °ag potential outliers a robustness check of the
results is possible. The suggested methods are not automatic procedures but only
give indications as to which observations should be scrutinized. It is always up to
the researcher to determine what to do with a °agged observation and the decision
is ultimately based on the in°uence an observation has on the overall results (Simar
(2003)). Therefore, a valid approach to check the robustness of the results is to focus
on frontier de¯ning countries, i. e. those countries that are potentially suspiciously
e±cient and bias the production possibility set upwards, and analyze how the results
change if some of these countries are eliminated from the sample. The focus of the
45 Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Jones and Olken (2005) used GDP de°ated by the
Laspeyres or by the chain index.
35robustness check in this paper is on low income countries. It seems unreasonable to
check the robustness of the results by leaving out high income countries as these are
precisely the countries that are expected to determine the production frontier.
As a starting point of the robustness check all countries used in section 3 are in-
cluded in the initial calculations. After that, observations determining the boundaries
of the production possibility set for very long periods of time and the respective coun-
tries are identi¯ed. These potentially in°uential countries are then stepwise eliminated
from the sample and the results are recalculated in order to analyze the extent of in°u-
ence of the respective observations. If the results change markedly by the elimination
of a country, this indicates unusual input-output combinations so that the country
should indeed be dropped to avoid biased technology frontiers. If, on the other hand,
the results change little despite the elimination of a country, similar countries have
to be available in the sample and the values of the dropped country are not extreme.
For ease of exposition, the following discussion focuses on the stability of capital's
contribution to growth rate changes. Of course, the other components of the growth
accounting decomposition are also sensitive to the choice of sample. Therefore, a
more detailed compilation regarding the impact of sample changes can be found in
Appendix B.
If all countries of section 3 are used in the nonparametric growth accouting calcu-
lations, the frequency and persistency of Jordan as a frontier de¯ning country arouses
suspicion. The input-output combinations of the years 1954, 1958, 1959 and 1967
de¯ne the boundaries of the production possibility set up to the year 2004. Therefore,
the calculations are repeated without Jordan. As a result, the contribution of capital
deepening to growth rate changes increases markedly - in upbreaks it accounts for
30 % instead of 22 % and in downbreaks it accounts for 46 % instead of 42 % (Ta-
ble 7). Once Jordan is dropped from the sample, other countries such as Nicaragua,
Costa Rica or El Salvador start to determine the boundaries of the production set
for small capital stocks per worker for long periods of time. However, dropping these
countries does not change the results of the tripartite decomposition nearly as much
as the elimination of Jordan. Apparently, there are enough countries in the sample
that are similar enough to yield comparable production frontiers. Therefore, only Jor-
dan is identi¯ed as a potential extreme value and left out in the preferred speci¯cation.
The case to eliminate Gabon from the sample is most obvious in Figure 4. Gabon
becomes a frontier de¯ning country in 1976 and remains so until the end of the sample.
In 1976 income per worker in Gabon is the highest in the world, even exceeding that of
36Table 7: The E®ect of Eliminating Countries From the Original Sample on the Importance of
Capital Deepening
Contribution of Capital Deepening to Growth Rate Changes
Upbreaks Downbreaks











Rica and El Salvador
27.97% 48.68%
This table shows the sensitivity of results with respect to the sample choice. Countries were
excluded if observations of a particular country de¯ned the world technology frontiers for long
periods of time.
advanced Western economies such as the United States or Switzerland. Capital stock
per worker, on the other hand, is of a magnitude generally found in middle income
countries. It is unreasonable to assume that this observation is not driven by extraor-
dinary factors. And indeed, the high income per worker can be explained by o®shore
oil production in Gabon. Clearly, if Gabon is retained in the sample, the results will be
biased. Suppose that the technology frontier for the next year remains unchanged and
suppose that a country extends its capital stock per worker and experiences growth.
If the country in question is, for instance, the United Kingdom, none of the result-
ing growth would be attributed to the enlarged capital stock, because the technology
frontier would be °at from Gabon onwards. On the other hand, if the country had
a lower capital stock per worker than Gabon, a large part of the resulting growth
would be attributed to capital deepening because the technology frontier would be
very steep in this region. If Gabon were eliminated from the sample, the technology
frontier would be less steep for the low capital stock country and steeper for the high
capital stock country. Therefore, the contribution of capital accumulation to growth
would become less and more important, respectively. It follows that Gabon heavily
in°uences the growth accounting results and should be excluded from the preferred
sample.46 Figure 4 also provides further support for the exclusion of Jordan in the
preferred sample. The ¯gure includes the input-output combinations of Jordan for the
years 1954, 1958 and 1959. Even in 1976, i. e. 20 years later than the original data
were collected, no country comes close to a comparably high income per worker with
a comparably low capital stock per worker. The exclusion of Jordan is corroborated.
46 Table 7 shows the impact of Jordan on the capital contribution with Gabon included in the
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Figure 4: Input-Output combinations in 1976
5.2 Quality Adjusted Workforce
This section investigates the robustness of the nonparametric growth accounting re-
sults with regard to quality adjusted labor inputs. The parametric growth accounting
literature has started very early to use more sophisticated measures of labor in order
to reduce the magnitude of the growth accounting residual (Denison (1962), Jorgenson
and Griliches (1967)). Subsequently, theoretical contributions such as Lucas (1988) or
Romer (1990) as well as empirical contributions (Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)) identi¯ed human capital as an important
determinant of growth. Therefore, it is a natural question to ask whether the results of
the previous section continue to hold if labor is quality adjusted. The usual approach
to incorporate human capital in a cross-country analysis is to focus on education only,
because otherwise the data constraint becomes insurmountable. Even this modest
approach leads to a considerable loss of data points because education data is only
available for a subset of countries and time periods.
Human capital is constructed following Hall and Jones (1999), and Bils and Klenow
(2000). By assumption, the e±ciency of labor increases proportionally with wages and
38wages rise with the years of schooling. Following Psacharopoulos (1994) and evidence
from Mincerian wage equations, the returns to education exhibit diminishing returns.
Formally, the human capital stock H of a worker in economy j at time t is de¯ned as
Hjt = e»(sjt); (27)
where s denotes the years of schooling an average worker is endowed with. » is a
piecewise linear function with zero intercept and a slope of 0.134 for the ¯rst four years
of education, 0.101 for the ¯fth to eighth year of education and 0.068 for education
beyond the eighth year. Thus, economy j at time t uses a total amount of ^ Ljt =
Ljte»(sjt) e±ciency units of labor. The production frontier in this context is calculated
as in equation (12) with Lj¿ being replaced by ^ Lj¿. The decomposition in equation
(19) is reformulated in terms of e±ciency units of labor (denoted by the hat symbol)
and extended by yet another factor that accounts for the growth of human capital.
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:= EFF ¢ TECH ¢ KACCUM ¢ LFP ¢ HACCUM: (28)
The data on the average years of schooling is taken from Barro and Lee (2000) and
is available at ¯ve year intervals. Between data points the average years of schooling
are obtained via linear interpolation.47
The availability of education data reduces the sample used in this section to 87
countries that experience a total of 66 of the previously calculated breaks. The total
years of schooling are only available from 1960 onwards so that only breaks occuring
in 1970 or later can be considered.48 Against this background it is unreasonable to
expect the exact numbers from section 4 to hold. However, it would be reassuring if
the main conclusions as summarized at the end of section 4.4 continued to hold. Table
8 summarizes the relative contributions to growth attributable to the di®erent factors
in equation (28) and the average level of e±ciency in the year preceding a growth
regime change.
47 Although unusual, linear interpolation of education data has also been used by Bassanini and
Scarpetta (2001) and Engelbrecht (1997).
48 As this section is meant to test the robustness of the previous results, the break dates were
not calculated anew for the shorter time series. Rather, all breaks occuring before 1970 were
simply discarded.
39The upper part of Table 8 relates to upbreaks, the lower part to downbreaks. In
the ¯rst column the average of growth regime changes in all countries is reported.
The paramount importance of productivity changes for both accelerations (65 %) and
decelerations (67 %) and the ¯nding that upbreaks happen at lower levels of e±ciency
(0.51) than downbreaks (0.69) are supported. The asymmetry between upbreaks and
downbreaks, however, no longer holds. The importance of capital accumulation in-
creases in upbreaks and decreases in downbreaks, making it essentially equally im-
portant for both types of breaks (32 %). Human capital explains less than 7% of
the increased growth rate around upbreaks. Around downbreaks, human capital con-
tributes negatively to the explanation of growth rate changes, indicating that human
capital continued to grow even in times of economic downturn.
The more detailed decomposition of upbreaks and downbreaks depending on the
level of development reveals that low income countries continue to experience catch-
up growth around upbreaks. 59 % of the observed growth rate changes are results of
improved e±ciency. Technological progress slows down during an upbreak, which is
mirrowed in its negative relative contribution. The results for high and middle income
countries di®er from those in the previous section. Productivity changes and therein
e±ciency changes are much more important than before (more than 80 % and 60
%, respectively). However, the result for high income countries is generated by one
observation, namely Ireland, where a structural break was recorded for 1994. Middle
income countries have four observations with the earliest upbreak occurring in 1984
and the other upbreaks occuring in 1993 or 1994. Due to the small number of obser-
vations the results for high and middle income countries cannot be well interpreted.
They might indicate that recent upbreaks in relatively well-o® countries are driven by
di®erent forces than earlier upbreaks. However, the results may equally well be an
artefact of the sample restrictions. For low income countries and hence for the only
category comprising enough observations to reasonably draw conclusions, it is justi¯ed
to say that the results around upbreaks do not change radically with the introduction
of human capital.
With regard to downbreaks, it seems that the introduction of human capital has
boosted the importance of technological change and diminished the contribution of
capital deepening as explanatory factors of growth rate declines in high and middle
income countries. Productivity changes now explain around 80 % of the growth rate
decline, whereas the contribution of capital accumulation to growth rate changes di-
40Table 8: Source of Growth Rate Changes Including Human Capital
Relative








Productivity 64.75% 88.61% 87.59% 57.52%
E±ciency 63.24% 61.59% 81.69% 58.71%
Technology 1.37% 25.91% 5.66% -1.25%
Capital
Deepening 32.09% 16.84% 13.13% 37.81%
Human Capital 6.70% 19.91% 8.97% 5.31%
Labor Force
Participation 8.59% 12.44 % 7.0 % 8.75 %
Level of
E±ciency 0.51 0.68 0.62 0.47
Observations 20 1 4 15
Downbreaks
Annual Growth
Productivity 66.84% 83.14% 75.44% 40.14%
E±ciency 44.12% 45.12% 51.10% 34.89%
Technology 22.50% 37.43% 24.20% 5.33%
Capital
Deepening 31.58% 13.38% 28.40% 53.83%
Human Capital -4.67% -3.11% -2.06% -9.32%
Labor Force
Participation -4.36% -0.90% -7.47% -4.22%
Level of
E±ciency 0.69 0.80 0.63 0.59
Observations 46 19 14 13
41minishes to 13 % in high income countries and 30 % in middle income countries.49 In
low income countries capital deepening now explains more than 50 % of the growth
rate changes and e±ciency changes become less important (35 % instead of the former
53 %). Nevertheless, the asymmetry of growth accelerations and growth decelerations
is no longer observable. Human capital continues to grow in all types of countries de-
spite growth decelerations as the negative contribution rates of human capital show.
6 Conclusion
This article has been inspired by Jones and Olken's (2005) ¯nding that capital deep-
ening has little impact on the acceleration or deceleration of growth rates, but that it
is rather productivity changes that are important. Since the importance of produc-
tivity change in the medium run is both a novel and theoretically unexpected ¯nding
and since Jones and Olken (2005) derive their results conditional on the strict as-
sumptions of parametric growth accounting, a validation of the results relying on a
di®erent method seems desirable. To this end, this paper applies the combined double
maximum supFT(` + 1j`) testing procedure for the derivation of structural breaks in
economic growth, which has more power than the originally used supFT(`+1j`) test.
Afterwards, the proximate sources of growth are determined using a nonparametric
growth accounting approach. This approach has the advantage of requiring fewer as-
sumptions than parametric growth accounting. In particular, the functional form of
the production function is not de¯ned beforehand so that the elasticity of substitu-
tion between factors is determined by the data. The same is true for the nature of
technological progress. Furthermore, no assumption regarding the market structure is
involved. The approach is therefore well suited to test whether the results by Jones
and Olken (2005) are a consequence of the assumptions implicit in their calculations
or whether they continue to hold in a much more °exible environment.
Notwithstanding the increased °exibility of nonparametric growth accounting the
results by Jones and Olken (2005) are largely con¯rmed. Despite a somewhat increased
ability of capital accumulation to explain growth regime changes, productivity changes
remain the crucial part of the explanation. This ¯nding is robust not only to the
method, but also to the state of development, to the inclusion of human capital and
to changes in the choice of countries. The asymmetry between growth accelerations
49 This change in results is not an e®ect of the sample change: if the productivity frontier is
calculated without human capital for the smaller sample the relative contribution of capital
deepening and technology are similar to those reported in Table 4. A table containing these
results is available upon request.
42and decelerations with respect to the importance of capital deepening is con¯rmed
in the absence of human capital, but not in the presence of it. The ability of non-
parametric growth accounting to discriminate between productivity changes due to
technological progress or productivity changes due to e±ciency changes further shows
that growth accelerations in poor countries are catch-up growth episodes whereas in
middle and high income countries they are (partly) a result of genuine technological
progress. It follows that policy measures aimed at increasing growth should di®er
between the types of countries. Whereas policies facilitating catch-up should be im-
plemented in low income countries, middle and high income countries should also rely
on policy measures supporting innovation capacities.
Several extensions of this paper are conceivable. As indicated in the main text the
robustness of nonparametric growth accounting is an issue. While it is reassuring that
parametric and nonparametric growth accounting reach the same conclusions, it would
nevertheless be of interest to implement a nonparametric growth accounting approach
based on robust frontier estimation. Another obvious question concerns appropriate
policy measures. While it is nice to know that developing countries tend to experience
catch-up growth in growth accelerations whereas high and middle income countries
also bene¯t from innovation, it would be fruitful to know more about what kind of
policy measure can assist with the acceleration of growth. In particular, it would
be interesting to di®erentiate between measures that are supporting catch-up growth
and measures that are supporting technological progress in the sense of frontier shifts.
The decomposition of productivity changes into technological and e±ciency changes
is a prerequisite to progress in this direction. Finally, the ¯nding of manifold struc-
tural breaks in the countries' growth rates and the varying importance of e±ciency
and technological changes or factor accumulation changes depending on the countries'
state of development underlines the need for a theory of growth that explicitly allows
countries to be in di®erent states. A state should at the very least be characterized
by the typical level of income and by the prevailing rate of growth. As the frequent
structural breaks indicate countries have to be able to switch between states. The
challenge lies in de¯ning how growth in particular states and growth transitions be-
tween states are governed.50 As Pritchett (2006) points out such a °exible model
would be of much use for ¯nding growth strategies that are suited to the particulars
and constraints di®erent countries ¯nd themselves in.
50 A ¯rst attempt at the empirical estimation of transition probabilities has been made by Jerz-
manowski (2006).
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49Appendix A
In the main text, the Bai-Perron methodology (Bai and Perron (1998, 2003)) has been
introduced in order to identify the number and dates of structural breaks in the growth
rate series of di®erent countries. In this appendix, the empirical implementation of
how to determine the break dates for a given number of breaks is presented in more
detail. Afterwards, the actual number of breaks is derived using the double maximum
supFT(` + 1j`) testing procedure as described in the main text.
A pure structural change model of the form given in equation (1) is considered.
For ease of exposition, the equation is repeated here.
gt = ¯i + "t: (A1)
As in the main text, gt denotes the annual growth rate of income per capita expressed
in purchasing power parity, ¯i marks the mean growth rate during growth regime i
and "t is a disturbance term. There are i = 1;:::;m + 1 growth regimes, i. e. m
break points (T1;:::;Tm) need to be determined. The break dates for a given m are
determined such that the sum of squared residuals for the m-partition (T1;:::;Tm)






[gt ¡ ¯i]2: (A2)
Empirically, the optimal partition of the growth rate series is found by solving the
recursive problem as given in equation (3), which is repeated here for convenience.
SSR(Tm;T) = min
mh6j6T¡h
[SSR(Tm¡1;j) + SSR(j + 1;T)]: (A3)
As before, SSR(Tr;n) denotes the sum of squared residuals associated with the opti-
mal partition of the time series containing r breaks and using the ¯rst n observations,
SSR(j+1;T) denotes the sum of squared residuals resulting from a partition starting
in (j + 1) and lasting until T. In the following, the steps needed to implement the
recursive procedure in practice are described.
In order to solve (A3), the sum of squared residuals (SSR) resulting from di®erent
partitions needs to be known. Therefore, an upper-triangular matrix M that contains
the estimated SSR for every conceivable growth regime is de¯ned. For a time series
with T = 25 observations matrix M is a 25 £ 25 matrix, where the information is
recorded above the principal diagonal. The rows of the matrix denote the starting
50and the columns of the matrix denote the ending dates of a growth regime. Hence,
the entry at position (5;10), for instance, contains the estimated SSR resulting from
a growth regime lasting from period 5 to period 10. It follows that the associated
estimated SSR for every conceivable growth regime can be read o® matrix M. The
estimated total SSR for every conceivable m-partition (T1;:::;Tm) of a time series can
be derived by summing up the estimated SSR for each growth regime. The estimated
SSR are obtained from regressing the growth rates for the period in question51 on a
constant and from summing up the resulting squared residuals.52
The next step concerns the implementation of equation (A3). To this end, two
further matrices are created. The ¯rst matrix, matrix L, records the minimal esti-
mated SSR for a sample running from period 1 to the column number for a given
number of breaks, which equals the row number minus one. In practice, the ¯rst line
of matrix L contains the estimated SSR for a sample running from period 1 to T, 1
to (T ¡ 1) etc. with no break and is therefore equal to the ¯rst line of matrix M.
The second line of matrix L contains the minimal estimated SSR for a sample run-
ning from 1 to T with one structural break, the minimal estimated SSR for a sample
running from 1 to T ¡ 1 with one structural break and so on. The structural break
is chosen such that the estimated total SSR is minimized. The timing of the break
is recorded in a second matrix B, which looks the same as matrix M. The minimal
estimated SSR for the series running from 1 to (T ¡ k) with one break is recorded in
matrix M at position (2;T ¡ k), in short M(2;T ¡ k). It is the linear combination of
L(1;T1)+M(T1+1;T¡k). Correspondingly, the break period is recorded in B(2;T¡k).
The third line in matrix L contains the minimal estimated SSR for samples run-
ning from period 1 to the column number with two breaks imposed upon. The line
is derived using the recursive procedure (A3). Intuitively, at each admissible second
break period j the procedure calculates the resulting estimated total SSR from match-
ing the break point with the corresponding optimal one-break partition and selects
the break point that yields the minimal overall result. The admissible second break
dates are restricted by the requirement that each growth regime has to last for at
least h periods. With the ¯rst break happening before the second one, the earliest
earliest admissible break date is 2h to ensure that the previous two growth regimes
51 The period in questions last from the time period as indicated by the row number to the time
period as indicated by the column number of the entry under consideration.
52 Bai and Perron (2003) originally propose to compute the matrix entries using the recursive
residuals formula suggested by Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) in order to simplify the
computation and to avoid too many matrix inversions. However, the use of estimated residuals
instead of recursive residuals does not constitute a problem, since the original distributions
and sequential procedures are derived in terms of estimated residuals.
51are of length h each. Similarly, the latest admissible break date is T ¡ h, otherwise
the third growth regime could not last for h periods. The matrices L and M pro-
vide exactly the ingredients needed to execute the optimization. The estimated SSR
for the optimal one-break partition spanning observations 1 to j is given by L(2;j).
The residuals for the remaining partition from observation j to T can be obtained
from M(j + 1;T). Hence, for every admissible j the estimated total SSR is given by
L(2;j)+M(j+1;T). The optimal second break point is found by selecting the period
j that minimizes L(2;j)+M(j+1;T), which is recorded in L(3;T). The period of the
break is collected in B(3;T). The entries for L(3;T ¡1), L(3;T ¡2) etc. are obtained
by carrying out the same calculations with the diminished sample running from 1 to
T ¡ 1, 1 to T ¡ 2 and so on. The same routine is repeated until m breakpoints are
imposed upon the time series. Once matrices L and B are derived, it is easy to read
o® the optimal break points. If m break points are determined, Tm is recorded in
B(m+1;T). The period of next break point Tm¡1 is found in B(m+1¡1;Tm), Tm¡2
is available in B(m + 1 ¡ 2;Tm¡1). One has to go back step by step until the timing
of the ¯rst break is obtained from B(m + 1 ¡ m;Tm¡(m¡2)).
52Appendix B
Table 9: Structural Breaks in Growth














Argentina 1974 1.91 0.25
Australia 1961 1.36 2.29
Austria 1973 5.01 2.11
Belgium 1959 1974 2.15 4.56 1.86
Bolivia 1959 -1.74 0.58
Botswana 1989 8.40 3.82
Brazil 1980 4.55 0.33
Cameroon 1975 1985 0.21 6.06 -1.35
Canada 1961 1.19 2.35
Chile 1985 0.97 4.31
China 1977 2.74 8.37
Colombia 1967 1980 1.41 3.37 1.03
Congo 1982 5.27 -2.63
Costa
Rica 1978 2.96 0.90
Cote
d`Ivoire 1989 2.45 -1.63
Denmark 1973 3.21 1.49
Dominican
Republic 1991 2.39 4.32
Ecuador 1980 3.42 -0.39
El
Salvador 1989 1978 2.01 -1.88 1.89
Finland 1974 4.47 1.89
France 1973 4.19 1.78
Gabon 1976 9.94 -3.61
Greece 1962,
1994 1973 4.61 7.86 0.59 3.21
Guatemala 1992 1980 1.96 -1.36 0.89
Guinea 1994 -0.55 3.27
Haiti 1980 4.12 -1.00
Hong
Kong 1994 6.40 1.18
Hungary 1979 4.65 1.93
India 1993 2.22 4.49
Indonesia 1969 1.14 3.70
Iran 1989 1976 5.86 -5.29 3.46
Ireland 1993 2.79 6.72
Israel 1973 4.85 1.38
Italy 1974 4.99 1.84
Jamaica 1985 1972 4.21 -2.35 1.39
Japan 1970,
1991 8.64 3.29 0.77
Jordan 1965 5.48 -0.67
53Table 9 continued









Korea 1962 1.04 6.25
Lesotho 1978 4.53 2.33
Madagascar 1971 0.89 -1.79
Malawi 1979 2.20 0.65
Malaysia 1970 2.81 4.94
Mauritius 1960 -4.15 3.66
Mexico 1981 3.47 0.31
Morocco 1960 -0.24 2.82
Mozambique 1986 1976 2.15 -3.08 3.54
Netherlands 1970 3.47 1.66
New
Zealand 1966 2.48 1.20
Nicaragua 1993 1976 2.87 -4.24 0.50
Nigeria 1960 4.48 0.45
Norway 1986 3.24 2.25
Pakistan 1960 1988 -0.39 3.63 1.41
Panama 1981 3.68 1.43
Paraguay 1971 1981 1.06 5.47 -0.38
Peru 1974 3.20 -0.38
Philippines 1977 3.17 0.92
Poland 1991 1979 6.01 -1.05 4.09
Portugal 1973 5.95 2.25
Romania 1979 8.14 0.87
Singapore 1994 5.39 1.99
South
Africa 1994 1983 1.97 -0.61 2.27
Spain 1984 1974 6.04 0.49 2.72
Sweden 1970 3.15 1.62
Switzerland 1973 3.42 0.80
Taiwan 1962 1994 4.41 7.21 3.82
Thailand 1959 -1.12 4.74




1993 1981 4.69 -2.96 7.46
Uganda 1988 -0.54 3.78
Venezuela 1977 2.78 -1.06
West
Germany 1960 6.77 2.58
The structural breaks are derived using the Bai-Perron methodology described in the text. The
minimum duration of a growth spell equals 10 years, the trimming parameter follows from the
number of observations, the size of the tests is 10 %. Upbreaks are those breaks where the
growth rate in the regime after the break exceeds the growth rate in the regime before the
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